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Introduction
From the early 2000s onwards, the ‘Jungle’, the name given by media and 
then inhabitants to a series of unofficial refugee camps around Calais, the 
nearest French port to the UK, saw the arrivals and departures of hundreds 
of thousands of refugees and migrants. In October 2016, the ‘Jungle’ came, 
in its most recent and obvious form, to an end. A UK-funded wall was 
constructed around the Calais port, and French authorities began registering 
all the residents in the camp, prior to its demolition. Many left before the 
camp was razed; others were transported to new locations around France, 
to await registration and processing as asylum seekers. A small number 
of unaccompanied minors and other vulnerable residents, most with UK 
family connections, were sent to the UK. At the time of its closure, the 
‘Jungle’ was home to approximately 8,000 people, by and large men; at its 
largest, it had housed around 10,000. 
Refugees’ formal and informal presence in Calais had a history first 
remarked on by the media in the 1990s. The Sangatte camp was opened 
in a former factory warehouse in 1999 to house 200 refugees living rough 
in the area, mostly from Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraqi Kurdistan. Run 
by the Red Cross, the camp was closed in 2002, by which time it housed 
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2,000 in squalid conditions, with smuggling activities fuelling considerable 
violence. Residence permits were issued by both France and the UK to ex-
residents, among whom there was said to be no overwhelming desire to get 
to the UK; Calais was just the last place they had reached. 
Refugees continued to arrive at this ‘last place’ to live informally in 
the woods around Calais. In 2009, their encampment, called the ‘jungle’ by 
French media, was cleared, and people moved to squat in smaller groups in 
the surrounding countryside or in the town. In late 2014, the French interior 
minister, Bernard Cazeneuve, supporting the mayor of Calais, responded 
to rising refugee numbers by opening the old Jules Ferry recreation centre 
on the edge of the town as a facility for women and children. The centre 
bordered an unused landfill area among sand dunes, known as La Lande 
(the marsh). Many recognised that this was no solution. Global conflicts 
forcing migration, incoherent international, European and national refugee 
policies, and local factors shaping refugee arrivals and conditions had not 
changed (Reinisch, 2015). As Jean-Pierre Alaux, a long-time activist with 
a refugee NGO presciently put it at the time: “The migrants are going to 
figure out that approximately 400 of them can be housed in this centre, and 
the others will build slums around it. It is doomed from the onset. In a few 
months, there will be so many people that Bernard Cazeneuve himself will 
close down this humanitarian hub” (Bouchard, 2014).
As Yvette Cooper wrote in the Guardian in January 2016 about the 
second ‘Jungle’ camp, “the most shocking thing about Calais is that it’s not 
even too big to solve” (Cooper, 2016). The 2014-2016 Calais ‘Jungle’ was 
nevertheless the largest unofficial European camp for forced migrants at the 
time. In 2015 alone, more than 1,000,000 refugees and migrants arrived in 
Europe (BBC, 2016). Many once again ended up in Calais. Now, a majority 
of this group had plans to reach the UK because of family associations, 
language, employment possibilities, or colonial history; because of their 
poor reception across the rest of Europe; and increasingly, because of French 
tolerance or facilitation of the inhumane situation within the ‘Jungle’ itself 
– the name ‘Jungle’ was taken up and used by many camp residents to 
emphasise appalling living conditions – and because of hostile treatment 
by some Calaisians and the French local administration and national state.
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The new ‘Jungle’ was separated by several kilometres from the town 
centre, rendering residents’ use of urban services difficult. Besides, some 
Calais residents’ verbal and physical hostility increased the dangers of going 
there. Located on the unwanted landfill site, with possibly toxic infill, the 
site had initially been allocated to refugees as a place where they could stay 
indefinitely. From a police perspective, it was conveniently far – a two-hour 
walk – from the port and train station. For the many residents who walked 
to these destinations, this location involved nightly, exhausting trajectories, 
cutting and crossing numerous razor wire fences, to make risky attempts to 
board boats, cars, trucks, and trains to the UK, and, if unsuccessful, this 
required walking back to the camp in the early morning. The camp was also 
itself bordered by roads to the port which presented a small and dangerous 
chance of boarding trucks. Police secured this border, particularly at the 
motorway bridge (Inanloo and Haghooi, 2016), as well as the perimeters of 
the port and station, and deployed tear gas and batons liberally, resulting 
in many injuries. The ‘Jungle’ in this 2015-2016 form was an effect of the 
UK paying the French government to outsource its border controls to the 
Calais region, the local police, and the national riot police, the CRS, and 
to upgrade them significantly. The camp was thus permitted but policed by 
France in collaboration with and funded by the UK - an alliance with, by 
then, a two-decade history (Mould, 2017). 
Today, around 700 people are estimated to be still living in Calais and 
its environs, attempting to reach the UK, now residing in worse conditions 
than in the camp: living in the open, with sporadic and insufficient access 
to shelter, food, water, warmth, and medical care (Refugee Rights Data 
Project, 2017). Paris has become another ‘Calais’, with informal settlements 
building up around the formal, small transit camp at La Chapelle, and there 
are similar settlements in nearby cities, for instance, Brussels. More broadly, 
barriers to movement have been strengthened in many other locations 
across Europe, producing poorly-served long-term unofficial encampments: 
for instance, in Ventigmilia on the Italian-French border; Lampedusa; the 
Greek islands of Chios, Samos, and Lesvos; the Greek-Macedonian border; 
in Athens; in Sicily; in Serbia; and – since the exporting of the EU border 
– also in Turkey.
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In 2015-2016, however, the Calais ‘Jungle’ was unique in displaying 
extremely inadequate living conditions for large numbers of relatively long-
term inhabitants in an informal European refugee camp. Many residents 
were rehoused in better conditions during and after the closure of the 
camp. All agreed that no one should have been left to live in the appalling 
conditions of this camp. Nevertheless, there was a great deal of discontent 
about the camp’s closure. Despite the poor sanitary conditions, inadequate 
food, water, clothes, shelter, and medical provision, fights related to 
smugglers and resources, and constant police and ‘third force’ violence, the 
‘Jungle’ developed powerful and positive meanings for many living there, 
including large numbers who worked as ‘volunteers’, that is, helping other 
camp residents. 
Given the ‘Jungle’s’ vigilant, often violent bordering, perhaps it was 
not surprising that despite its abject conditions, the camp operated for 
many residents as the only safe and productive space locally available to 
them (Africa et al., 2017). However, the positive meanings of the ‘Jungle’ 
also lay to a considerable extent in the forms of lived everyday citizenship 
that grew up there. By ‘citizenship’, we are referring here to practices of 
effective public engagement that, for us, can usefully be seen not in relation 
to nation states and their colonial histories – in which context they are 
clearly problematic for the field of forced migration and more broadly, 
for decolonial approaches (Smith and Rogers, 2016) – but through the 
decolonial lens of mobile resistances in and to coloniality (Joseph-Gabriel, 
2015) and postcoloniality, and as part of the ‘expansive project’ of democracy 
(Mbembe, 2016). All politics, insofar as it involves acting with others, relies 
on some notion of citizenship but not all conceptions of citizenship are 
linked to place. The forms of politics and citizenship that we are concerned 
with here, while certainly emerging in the physical space of the ‘Jungle’, are 
not restricted to this space.
Arising, then, from the camp’s unofficial status and the lack of 
local, national, or large NGO support for the residents; appalling camp 
conditions; intense external surveillance and aggression; and, most 
significantly, residents’ own strong sense of sociality and solidarity, a 
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number of important forms of political practice developed within the 
camp. These practices operated particularly strongly before the evictions 
and demolitions in March 2016 but were re-established to some extent 
after that (Picquemal, 2016). Many such engagements had occurred in the 
Calais region before, for instance in the ‘No Borders’ protests in 2009 that 
brought together a network of mainly UK, French, and Belgian groups 
and individuals with refugees (Rigby and Schlembach, 2013). The active, 
‘mobile citizenly’ politics of the prior ‘Jungle’ have also been recognised and 
analysed (Rygiel, 2011). However, the size, integration, and complexity of 
political practices within the 2014-2016 ‘Jungle’ call for specific attention.
Several groups of actors contributed to these developments. First, 
many of the refugee residents had considerable employment and voluntary 
experience, as well as education, language abilities, and backgrounds in 
community or political work that enabled them to identify major problems, 
look for solutions, and build structures and processes that could implement 
those solutions. Second, the ‘Jungle’ attracted a large number of volunteers 
and small NGOs from France and the UK, as well as other European countries 
and countries outside Europe, who delivered and cooked food, built shelters, 
cleared rubbish, provided medical services and legal assistance, and engaged 
residents in educational, artistic, and community building activities. Third, 
many refugees worked alongside French, British, and other European 
volunteers and NGOs in these endeavours, and negotiated with them the 
ways in which the camp would run and how services would be delivered. For 
instance, varying sets of residents, NGOs, and volunteers came to collective 
agreements about the content and form of camp political resistances and 
interventions, such as resident-led silent protests, often by specific national 
groups, when refugees died on the road or rails while trying to get to the 
UK; the hunger strike by Iranian residents which was supported, with some 
criticisms, by NGOs, volunteers, and other resident groups in the camp; the 
refugee rights organisations’ successful legal action, in collaboration with 250 
residents, against local authorities’ early 2016 plans to demolish parts of the 
camp serving social functions; and the protests within Calais town centre, 
often organised by No Borders, with significant camp resident participation. 
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Popular media often concentrated on reporting the inhuman 
circumstances of life in the ‘Jungle’, or later, on violent clashes between 
groups living there. Representations of refugees themselves were ‘bordered’ 
by silencing, collectivising, and de-contextualising within European 
media, as the refugees themselves were by European states (Chouliaraki 
and Zaborowksi, 2017). However, reports from refugee residents (Africa et 
al., 2017) and volunteers alike, as well as our own notes and observations, 
suggest that ideas of deliberative democracy, freedom, equality, and human 
rights, seen Eurocentrically by many as core ‘European’ values, were pivotal 
in the camp’s political practices. These so-called ‘European’ values were at 
the same time often in dialogue within the camp with other, broader or 
more critical ideas about democracy and politics, as well as with religious 
and cultural understandings of community formation, charity, and kinship. 
Such dialogues could be seen as constructing a new form of ‘European’ 
politics – that is, politics within Europe – something similar, perhaps, 
to the reconstitution of ‘Mediterranean’ identities mapped out by Solera 
(2016) and the constant renegotiations of ‘becoming-Europe’ in the light of 
ongoing migration, suggested by Amin (2004).
This chapter discusses the operation of everyday political organisations 
and processes in the ‘Jungle’. It does not focus extensively on explicitly 
political discourses or actions within or about the camp,1 but rather 
considers those instances in parallel with more quotidian examples of 
political talk and practice. In particular, it looks at four distinct, though 
often overlapping, kinds of politics that were apparent: (1) the use of 
‘rights’ language and action in constituting the camp residents as political 
citizens; and then three forms of cooperative politics: (2) coalitions between 
residents and volunteers as a political practice; (3) the politics of commons 
operating alongside deliberative processes in the camp; and (4) associative 
spaces within the camp, which also developed a range of political practices 
reaching out from their initial, specific remits. 
Over two years after the closure of the camp, the chapter also asks 
whether these forms of political process that developed in the ‘Jungle’ 
are limited to the physical and temporal space of such environments, or 
whether they have potential to continue transforming the ‘citizenship’ and 
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democracies of forcibly displaced people in Europe, and of Europe itself, 
after the camp’s closure. Do they, in bell hooks’ (2000) phrase, describing 
intersectional feminism’s potential to adopt perspectives on the edge as 
well as in the mainstream, open up the possibility of an extended political 
understanding more generally, in which the ‘Jungle’ and similar spaces 
could act critically and oppositionally (Said, 1984), but at the same time – 
given the inherent limits of such ‘edge’ strategies – in a doubled way, as new 
political ‘centres’ of thought and action? 
This chapter is informed by our experiences of teaching an accredited 
short university course in the Calais ‘Jungle’ between October 2015 and 
October 2016. In that time, we travelled to Calais on average every two 
weeks to teach, deliver art and photography workshops, and help students 
write their coursework and stories. The course, ‘Life Stories’, aimed to help 
refugees build capacity to tell and write their own stories, or the stories 
of other people, groups, or places; to introduce them to higher education 
systems in the UK and relevant other countries; and to encourage them 
to continue their education once their circumstances permitted (Squire, 
2017). More than 60 students attended the course in Calais.2 Many also 
engaged in further writing projects, including a co-authored book, Voices 
from the Jungle (Africa et al., 2017). Some produced films and participated 
in photography workshops – work that again, they have often continued.3 
Our teaching was not linked to research, and no research interviews 
were conducted with our Calais students. Instead, this chapter draws on 
broadcast media reports and other publicly available information about the 
camp, as well as social media accounts, and published accounts and art by 
refugee residents themselves. The chapter is also based on our field notes 
about camp organisation, made while we were teaching, as well as personal 
reflections on the camp.
Politics of human rights, human rights as politics 
Human rights are frequently at the core of political activism and 
citizenship struggles, of national and broader kinds, globally. As An’Naim 
(1999) states, whether human rights are considered to be culturally and 
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socially fitting to the context of the activism or not, the concept of political 
rights is necessary in creating the conditions for political participation and 
citizenship. For refugees in the ‘Jungle’, human rights presented themselves 
as paradoxical. Most had fled dire political situations, war, and persecution 
in countries like Afghanistan, Iran, Sudan, and Eritrea to seek safety in 
Europe. Arriving in Calais, they were incredulous that such a lack of rights 
and freedom could be found in the middle of Europe (Africa et al., 2017). 
Police violence and arbitrary arrests and detention, as well as hostility 
and violence from local people, a few of them allegedly connected to the 
police, were common experiences for ‘Jungle’ residents. For example, the 
Independent reported on 14 October 2016 that the French police were 
taking refugees’ shoes to prevent them from leaving the Jungle ahead of 
the registration and processing of all camp residents prior to demolition 
(Bulman, 2016). In April 2016, the Independent reported that 75% of Calais 
refugees had experienced police violence, a figure that tallies with anecdotal 
and written reports from our students (Africa et al., 2017; Yeung, 2016).
Postcolonial and decolonial critics of human rights frameworks have 
argued that human rights are a Western concept and thus cannot be applied 
directly in non-Western contexts (Clapham, 2007). Robins (2012) has shown 
how, in the context of post-conflict Nepal, a global human rights agenda 
that prioritises transitional justice over economic rights serves to maintain 
inequality and political marginalisation, instead of critically engaging 
with the structures that create these disempowerments. Human rights are 
prioritised in global discourses and serve the global political elites, leaving 
local political activists trying to fit their agendas into these discourses. 
Rights-based activism is defined by Hamm (2001) as activism that posits 
the achievement of human rights as the objective of development; it is 
prioritised by both funding bodies and political institutions. In this form 
of activism and development work, the immediate material and structural 
needs of the community may be considered secondary to the pursuit of 
human rights for their own sake. 
These dilemmas of fitting human rights language into local contexts 
are usually presented around non-Western and particularly post-conflict 
situations, where rights, seen as either Western, or as a culture in themselves 
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(Cowan et al., 2001), constructed around the large international machinery 
of development and civil society, do not fit the local cultural and social 
constructions of what makes up a just society. But as Dembour and Kelly 
(2011) have noted, and as we have witnessed through our work in the 
‘Jungle’, human rights do not seem to apply either to irregular migrants 
in the West – in Europe or in the United States. In the ‘Jungle’, residents 
suffered, in addition to the aforementioned police and third-party violence 
and intimidation, lack of adequate shelter and resources, inhumane sanitary 
conditions, inadequate access to health care, including mental health 
provisions, and lack of access to schools for children. Dembour and Kelly 
(2011) ask whether the lack of access to human rights of irregular migrants, 
such as the residents of Calais ‘Jungle’, is a question of implementation, 
or whether it is a question of how human rights have been defined. In 
their introduction, Dembour suggests that human rights have been co-
opted by Western states in such a way to form a framework for regulation 
rather than protection, and that defining national citizenship, the exclusive 
right of states, remains the core of this regime of regulation and inequality 
(Dembour, 2011: 11). 
Despite these obvious limitations and the constant human rights 
violations by the state, residents and volunteers in the ‘Jungle’ camp 
consistently used rights language when demanding further provisions and 
protection. For example, in 2015, MSF used health and environmental 
rights arguments to secure garbage disposal and water provision for the 
camp. During the French government demolition of over half the camp 
in March 2016, a local voluntary association led the legal fight to protect 
camp schools, libraries, and cultural venues by advancing arguments for 
sociocultural rights. Many of these structures were then marked by residents 
and volunteers in large script as lieux de vie, places of social sustenance, to 
preserve them from demolition. Children’s rights arguments were deployed 
by a wide variety of actors to promote minors’ resettlement and continued 
service provision for them in the camp. Rights to safety and security were 
effectively claimed by residents’ committees and voluntary associations in 
relation to elements of the local and national state, particularly the police 
and the fire brigade. More broadly, rights to full national citizenship were 
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asserted by some camp residents who developed educational provision as the 
basis of a secular republic, a kind of perfected mirror of the existing French 
state, at the lieu de vie of the Ecole Laique du Chemin des Dunes (Chemin des 
Dunes Secular School) (Ducatteau, 2017). This proposal had some impact 
within French civil society, being widely transmitted by centre and left 
newspapers and broadcasters, and by some international media. However, it 
is important to note, as perhaps Dembour and Kelly (2011) would, that these 
rights-based initiatives had limited success. Legally-mandated provision of 
requirements for human life in the camp was always minimal and under 
threat; arrangements for child residents were honoured more in terms of their 
breach than their observance, with around 1,000 unaccompanied minors 
the last to be transported and housed after the camp’s final demolition; and 
the increasingly loud claim of the Ecole Laique du Chemin des Dunes and 
other camp organisations to constitute an alternative republic was said to 
be one reason why local and national actors thought the increasingly well-
functioning, rights-regulated camp had to go.
The way in which rights language was evoked in relation to the 
conditions in the ‘Jungle’ camp resonates with what Miller (2010) calls 
rights-framed activism. Framing is a theory that suggests that actors choose 
between different frames to look at a particular issue and choose the most 
appropriate language and strategies to address it in different political 
platforms. Frames do not need to fit together and are not necessarily based 
on the ideology of the organisation, but can be used strategically, as with 
the language of ‘rights’ (Mbali, 2013; Robins, 2012) to address a certain 
audience or to discuss sensitive issues that might not be open for discussion 
outside of that reference point. An organisation could thus strategically opt 
for a human rights approach in one campaign, without committing to the 
principles of that frame in their wider activism, or assuming that the rights 
approach would be a necessary or sufficient element of their politics. 
Another way to think about the use of rights in political activism is 
by understanding rights language as a form of translation. According to 
Merry, human rights “need to be translated into local terms and situated 
within local contexts of power and meaning” or “remade in the vernacular” 
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(2006:1). This approach accords closely with Homi Bhabha’s (2000) 
argument that a fundamental right, necessary though not sufficient, is the 
‘right to narrate’.
The rights claims in relation to the ‘Jungle’ were made locally and 
directly to the relevant authorities, as well as by using international 
channels to put further pressure on the local authorities. These translations 
of needs into norms - together with the complex media strategies used to 
communicate them - were often created in co-operations between residents, 
and between volunteers and camp residents. Such co-operations are the 
second object of this chapter.
Cooperative politics: Coalitions, commons, and associations
The cooperative political strategies pursued in the ‘Jungle’ and explored 
in this section are not less strategic than those examined above. They, 
too, may be pursued in concert with each other, and/or alongside rights 
strategies. What distinguishes them from the rights practices discussed 
above, however, is first, that their principles of operation relate to recognised 
practices of action between the cooperative partners, which instantiate their 
political aims, unlike rights strategies which may or may not foreground 
rights-framed means of pursuing rights as aims. Second, and relatedly, these 
cooperative practices have varying aims. While in the case of the ‘Jungle’ in 
2014-2016, such practices’ aims were overwhelmingly politically progressive, 
they are not universally and fully so by definition, although it seems likely 
that consistently cooperative practices are never completely consonant 
with far-right or totalitarian political aims. This potential variability, 
conflict, openness, and pragmatism in cooperative political trajectories is 
explored below (Derrida, 1996; Mbembe, 2016; Mouffe, 1996). We start by 
examining strategies of coalition, involving explicit combination and some 
degree of unification, albeit temporary.
A coalitional politics made of strategic alliances was built in the ‘Jungle’ 
between residents and voluntary associations both for delivering services and 
advocacy purposes. These coalitions were often highly effective in improving 
service delivery, such as in distributing goods, construction, mounting arts 
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and educational projects, and gathering data. Longer-term objectives and 
strategies, however, were more complex and problematic. The constraints 
of such coalitional citizenship emerged very strongly in situations of high 
resident mobility, variable volunteer investment, and large imbalances of 
economic, social, and symbolic capitals between the partners. 
In one much-debated conflict, the ‘organic democracy’ (Dewey, 1916) 
of the camp residents’ committee, which at the start of 2016 was said to be 
functioning well to resolve tensions within the camp and to some degree 
to negotiate with local political actors, broke down. Some of its external 
volunteer allies and attenders did not accede to the committee’s call to 
stop what it described as degrading, inefficient, and often unjust line-based 
goods distributions, which had become the ongoing practice of some small 
NGOs. Other NGOs had transferred to ticket-based systems operating 
through dispersed distribution points staffed by camp residents, which 
could reach in-need recipients not able to queue. In this circumstance, both 
coalition partners, resident committee members, who were at this point also 
criticised for not fully representing camp residents in terms of age, gender, 
educational background, nationality, or views, and some volunteers – who 
were at this time said to be assuming the ability to ‘speak for’ refugees 
from their own positions of privilege and ignorance, and to be assuming 
the authority to judge refugees’ self-governance – failed to resolve the issue 
within their coalitional framework. Among residents themselves, another 
breakdown threatened: committee members’ solidarity with mainly 
Iranian resident hunger strikers (Marlowe, 2016) started to fracture as the 
hunger strikers weakened, though that solidarity was maintained publicly 
till the hunger strike’s end. The exigencies of such moments ceded to other 
crises, and the issues receded in significance, allowing renewed coalitional 
activity. But such merely successional resolutions of difficulties still point 
to the limits of this model of political citizenship. Different socioeconomic 
interests – those of people dispossessed of economic, social, and symbolic 
capitals, as well as national citizenship, by forced migration, versus 
those privileged if precaritised by European citizenships,  and different 
conceptual framings – contradictory models of social help, and different, 
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organic and representational, models of democracy – cannot be resolved 
within the explicitly laid down conditions that a coalition requires. It is 
notable that accounts of coalitional politics in refugee and migrant contexts 
tend to focus on situations of greater stability - for example, longstanding 
immigrant US faith communities as coalitional services providers (Ebaugh 
and Pipes, 2001), or relatively settled migrants and refugees within Europe 
(Agustin and Jorgensen, 2016). Perhaps in these circumstances, the kinds 
of ‘transversal’ dialogues about difference that feminists have made integral 
to coalitional politics (Cockburn, 2015) have greater potential.
The carryover of coalitional political processes after the camp’s 
demolition was difficult, as people dispersed to different geographical 
and social locations – the latter both exacerbating and clarifying power 
differences between, for instance, camp residents who became UK asylum 
seekers living in small towns in the north of England with €40 a week 
plus accommodation, other asylum seekers supported by family members 
or friends, and UK volunteers who returned to relatively high levels of 
disposable income. At the same time, some coalitions between resident and 
non-resident volunteers who had worked together to provide physical and 
psychosocial support continue, in the case for instance of the Hopetowns 
network,4 which aims to provide similar support for refugees in the UK.
Another model of politics that can be distinguished from the above is 
a politics of ‘commons’, perhaps better articulated in relation to the camp in 
the more contextualised terms of religious conventions of sanctuary, and/
or anti-colonial articulations of deliberative democracy (see for instance 
Mbeki, 1999 and Shoukri, 2011). Such common frameworks were often 
developed between residents, sometimes, again through the residents’ 
committee, but also in collective educational and cultural endeavours, 
and in religious settings. These articulations worked to allow joint, but not 
necessarily fully or explicitly deliberated action across, for instance, different 
political and religious views and national and cultural backgrounds, in 
favour of commonly held goals, for example in order to resolve internal 
camp conflicts between national groups over resources, and to negotiate 
with social service agencies, the police, and the local authority in the Calais 
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region. More simply, some such commonings supported collective living 
arrangements that worked across the (already fairly loosely held) national 
and language affiliations that structured the camp geography. For instance, 
group living spaces set up by Darfuri Sudanese refugees also worked as 
common spaces, including Black African Muslim refugees from other 
countries. Large tents and containers provided by the prefecture after the first 
demolitions became occupied by groups of friends from divergent national 
and religious backgrounds who looked out for each other, going to ‘try’ (to 
cross to the UK) together, for example (Africa et al., 2017). Against frequent 
criticisms of the politics of commons as vague, fetishistic, even nostalgic 
fantasy, and despite not having available the intensity of digital migrant 
commons (Trimikliniotis et al., 2014), or, generally, the basic conditions of 
life that would allow the imagining of a new European commons (Amin, 
2004), these were highly practical and mobile imaginings and livings of 
collectivity, though they could indeed be inattentive to differences between 
subjects and their resources, and inadequate to the external challenges of 
state and other forces (Berlant, 2016; De Angelis, 2017). For these reasons, 
the practices of ‘commoning’ citizenship also proved fragile, in relation 
to external actors to whom residents had differential powers of access – 
such as smugglers, asylum lawyers, and voluntary associations – and in 
relation to refugee residents’ overall different resource levels - for instance, 
national and class differences in mobilisable capitals available to them. In 
addition, age differences and language groups cut across apparent national 
and cross-national commons. And even more than in the coalitional model, 
in which gender was widely discussed, though women’s integration was 
little performed, the masculinities of the ‘Jungle’ commons tended to go 
unquestioned. 
Such commoning political practices were again hard to maintain in 
the aftermath of the camp’s demolition, when resource differences between 
residents accentuated and links attenuated; although it may be that online 
commoning provided some continuity of this kind. In the UK, groups of 
asylum seekers housed together in many instances also continued practices 
of commoning, particularly around buying and cooking food on very 
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limited incomes, not just across national or ethnic groupings, but where 
sufficient commonality of language and food taste allowed this. Support 
events bringing together ex-Calais residents and volunteers now in the UK 
to make and eat food5 could be said also to derive from a ‘commoning’ 
politics of sociality.
Finally, another form of political citizenship emerged from some 
specific camp institutions that gathered people around them associatively, 
both physically and socially - particularly schools, food distribution points, 
places of worship, art and legal services, and shops. The burgeoning 
associative politics of lieux de vie micro-neighbourhoods within the ‘Jungle’, 
based precisely in places rather than functions of living, intersected and 
coexisted with the cooperative practices previously discussed. 
Such associative practices might seem, when considered separately, 
a weaker, more minimal politics, driven by metonymy rather than the 
stronger, metaphorical conceptual framings of coalitional, commoning, 
or indeed ‘rights’-based political practices in the camp. The resituating of 
the youth service provision in an available space closer to Jungle Books 
Library, for example, later generated additional service provision across 
the two organisations; while the resituating of the Ecole Laique Du 
Chemin des Dunes was driven from the start by the aim of meeting the 
rights requirements of child and family as well as adult residents, and the 
proximity of family residences to the new location. 
The camp’s associative political practices could perhaps be seen as 
underpinned by minimal forms of coalition and commoning, based on 
the general assumptions about human connection and similarity, without 
explicit elaboration of either, that simple place links signify: who people 
were, and where they were. However, given such minimal articulations, it 
seems useful to treat associative political practices as distinct. 
One example of such associative practices is how collaborative efforts 
between refugees and volunteers who had established the Jungle Books 
Library, close to and battening onto the stability of the early-built Eritrean 
church, then extended more widely, link by link, place by place: first, by 
creating a larger room for meeting and conversation; next, by building 
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a children’s space close to the library; after that, by setting up a radio 
station which recorded camp events alongside mainstream media, made 
programmes broadcast across the camp, and was often staffed by children; 
subsequently, by housing hunger strikers within the children’s space; later, 
by supporting a mobile information and wifi hub, housed in an old horse 
trailer; and finally, by opening a free café for children that also functioned 
as a protective and legal advice space for them. Throughout this time, the 
library also became associatively differentiated within its existing spaces, by 
intension rather than extension: it served as the core of a small amount of 
safe housing and sometimes as housing itself; as a place for food and clothing 
distribution; and as a place to relay legal information - early submissions of 
data on children with a right to UK family reunification and adults with 
histories of working for UK military forces with a right to settle there - were 
made here, as well as a centre of education. 
The diversification of functions via associative extension or intension 
was not unique to the functionally relatively open space marked out by the 
library. Schools in the camp, distribution centres, and restaurants, all at 
times operated similarly. For example, the Ecole Laique du Chemin des 
Dunes, which started as a small wooden classroom, was rebuilt in late 2015 
to include a large adult classroom, a children’s classroom and playground, 
a meeting room which also showed movies, a clinic used by volunteer 
nurses, and small shelters that housed volunteers. While this constellation 
of buildings and functions had clear rights justifications, it also generated 
associatively, with no explicit rights warranting other activities within 
the spaces, such as a poetry and writing group, and musical events; it 
hosted visiting academics from Lille University for whom it served as the 
recruitment centre for an access course that in 2016-2017 educated 80 ex-
Jungle residents. During the October 2016 demolitions, when most of the 
rest of the camp had been burned down, it was used as an emergency shelter 
for unaccompanied minors for whom no other provision had yet been made. 
Smaller patterns of association also developed. The short course, and 
photo and other workshops we taught were distributed to communal spaces 
across the camp, including the Jungle Books Library, the Ecole Laique du 
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Chemin des Dunes, l’Ecole des Arts et Métiers (The School of Arts and 
Crafts), the Darfuri School, and other educational organisations established 
by residents – and so it became associatively linked to other possibilities, 
particularly around education (Lounasmaa, 2016). Our last workshop 
on university opportunities across Europe, delivered as a series of small 
group discussions across most of the above camp sites, and some others, 
in October 2016, was probably the most valued additional intervention we 
made. Course teachers and students also became involved with collecting 
information for Safe Passage, the organisation facilitating family, as well 
as referring residents to other services across and outside the camp and 
supporting some students’ writing and filmmaking activities. A small-
scale, intermittent, dispersed initiative of the kind with which we were 
involved had little chance of becoming fully embedded in the coalitional or 
commoning politics of the ‘Jungle’, but at times it did deploy strategically 
the language of refugees’ ‘right’ to higher education. However, its strongest 
framings of citizenship were, perhaps inevitably, associative.
Such associative politics joined spatial, sometimes only occasional, 
neighbours as friends – the term ‘friend’ indeed being used and preferred, 
as a broad signifier of association rather than extreme closeness, to describe 
links between residents, between external volunteers, and between those 
two groups (although more familial terms were also sometimes used). These 
extended ‘friendship’ networks were similar to the ‘weak’ ties which have 
been widely shown, across the global south and north, to promote health, 
wellbeing, and social cohesion, including for refugees (Wells, 2011). In 
themselves, such weak associations can be transitory and contradictory. They 
may, though, generate ‘bridging’ social capital – rather than the bonding 
social capital produced by closer links, including those of commoning and 
coalitional practices – which can support their positive effects. However, such 
capitalisations cannot be said themselves to maintain and extend this form 
of politics. It seems, rather, to be the diversity, fluidity, and contradictions 
of ‘weak’-associative political practices that have allowed them, after the 
camp’s demolition, to ‘migrate’ to new political contexts and be sustained 
there: their heterogeneity and improvisational character lets them change.
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Such habits of associative practices seem, then, to have been especially 
likely to carry over into post-Calais contexts; the citizenships they generated 
have spread. For instance, the Hopetowns network forged by refugees and 
volunteers in the UK to support asylum-seekers isolated by the country’s 
dispersal system, originally drawing on camp coalitions, became a more 
open and associational site of political practice, considering how to ally with 
people who are homeless, and working particularly now through language 
education in sites where this appears as a demand, not only from refugees. 
The broadening of food-based organisations to improvise responses to other 
needs show how groups based on a commoning politics of food can also 
start to articulate politics more associatively. Another example is the French 
online post-demolition network Info CAO Refugees, sharing information 
and solutions for the dispersed residents of the ‘Jungle’, working across ex-
residents and volunteers, French and British, to consider issues of housing, 
food, education, legal services, and community relations. The ‘Phone Credit 
for Refugees’ group’s development from provision within the camp to 
provision for those flung out of it, to much broader, now-global provision, 
with concomitant changing patterns of priority and validation, and 
growing webs of links to, for instance, safeguarding and youth provision, is 
an ongoing associative practice emblematised even in its fundraising, which 
deploys the associative powers of social media platforms to generate chains 
of posts to friends, and friends of friends (Phone Credit for Refugees, no 
date). The Refugee Buddy Network’s name itself instantiates such associative 
politics. Our own educational networks from the Life Stories courses have 
been sustained, and have helped generate new education initiatives within 
the UK, supported by prior students, as well as providing continuing 
support for ex-residents seeking other education, finding accommodation, 
and pursuing legal cases, and for public campaigns.
It seems then that associative political practices can develop frames 
of citizenship with some autonomy from immediate political forces. Even 
when such forces prevent these politics operating in their first contexts, 
they can move to, survive in, and appear in others. They thus display 
some of the creativity and adaptability often now described as ‘horizontal 
democracy’6 in relation to the Occupy movement (Maeckelbergh, 2011) for 
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instance, but they are much more tied to diverse materialities of political 
engagement, and to attempts to reform specific structures of power, than 
that movement. As a counter, we could relate these associative political 
engagements to Paul Hirst’s (1994) associative democracy, suggested for 
perhaps more conventional settings of economic and social governance. 
Such an approach would allow us to see camp and post-camp structures 
of individuals, voluntary groupings, and small NGOs as working in loose 
alliance - not to expand democracy from state centrism, as in Hirst’s 
examples, but rather to build such expanded democracy from the ground 
up, in situations and for people for whom there is none, that is, in a space 
where no formal politics obtains except for the very considerable bordering 
power of the state. Such associational politics does not so much doubly 
speak from the margin to occupy and reconstitute the centre, as it turns 
about that axis to create a multidimensional space for conflict and dialogue.
The future of new forms of ‘European’ politics
Thus far, we have argued that the politics of the camp can be understood as 
emerging from the experience of the denial of human rights for the camp 
residents. To the extent that this politics is itself articulated in the language 
of human rights, it can be thought of as a ‘strategic framing’ (Miller 2010) 
or ‘translation’ of particular needs into norms (Mbali, 2013; Robins, 2012). 
The insistence that the language of human rights be translated into the 
vernacular is not simply an issue of cross-cultural communication but a 
central tenant of cultural justice relating to the ‘right to narrate’. To claim 
a right, or protest its deprivation, it must be meaningful and relate to the 
experience of the person claiming the right. 
We have also suggested that camp residents’ needs and demands 
generated cooperative processes that could be understood as coalitional; 
commoning; and associational. If the first is the typical political process of 
interest-brokering in order to create a coalition, the second relates to forms 
of organisation emerging from shared resources. The third associational 
processes relate to the creation of forms resembling civil society organisations 
in democratic states. 
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We found the most compelling evidence for the recovery of the right 
to narrate in the creation of associational forms in the camp that not only 
sought to secure the welfare of camp residents but also to make a shared 
life possible. These associational forms made possible elements of civic 
participation and citizenship generally unavailable to migrants as members 
of transitory communities in camps. They augmented agency. And even 
though this agency is dwarfed by the bordering power of the state, it 
nonetheless begins the work of translating abstract norm into lived reality. 
Through the creation of a school with differentiated space for adult and 
child learners, the organisation of volunteers and so on, the right to an 
education and to family life is given meaning and transformed from an 
ethical imperative devolving from, for the most part, those with agency to a 
politics for camp members recovering their agency. This is why the closure 
of the camp was such a brutal act, forcibly dispersing the people gathered 
there and erasing the schools, cafes, and libraries that gave its residents the 
semblance of a human flourishing life.
We return now to the broader questions raised in the introduction 
about the significance of this experience and what it might mean for 
European politics – the practice of politics in Europe – today. The camp 
has now gone but as indicated above, there seem to be ways in which the 
forms of politics that began to flourish there live on and have survived the 
physical destruction of the camp. This survivance is not restricted to the 
inspiration that the camp’s history provides for citizens or inhabitants of 
European states. Rather, the repertoires of practice innovated in the camp 
themselves continue. Do they potentially question and ultimately extend 
the conceptions of ‘citizenship’ in Europe and perhaps elsewhere?
What was striking for us as volunteers, teachers, and researchers 
was the degree of self-organisation in the camp and the range of different 
forms of politics that were beginning to flourish there. This activity and 
heterogeneity problematised traditional distinctions between active citizen 
and passive recipient of humanitarian aid. As we encountered inhabitants of 
the camp they were active, engaged and, in many cases, co-producers of the 
services that they utilised. Excluded from the rights and the protections of 
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citizenship of European states, they nonetheless manifested and practiced 
many of the most broadly recognised attributes of ‘citizenship’. Camp 
residents were not simply interned in the camp, they were, to a certain 
degree, citizens of the camp capable of exerting a degree of control over their 
lives. As members of associations that they themselves created, their ability 
to act was both amplified and diversified. Their creativity and productivity 
stood in stark relief to the spasmodic and faltering response of the EU and 
its member states to the refugee ‘crisis’, the all-too predictable response of 
national governments fearful of the backlash from disaffected voters, and 
the conflicted local state. 
The politics of the camp was exemplary in multiple ways: as an example 
of what is possible in the most unpromising of situations – unpromising 
because of the very real need and vulnerability of camp residents and because 
of the bordering activity of the state; as a repertoire of practice that does not 
simply reproduce the existing regulatory frameworks; and in the creative 
and imaginative ways in which camp residents framed their protests and 
met their needs, drawing on the most slender bank of resources. The setting 
up of a library led to the creation of meeting rooms, differentiated spaces 
for young and old, wifi hotspots, and so on. Such creativity, it might be 
objected, is necessitated by the prior absence of facilities and infrastructure 
usually to be found in developed states. Yet still, the ingenuity with which 
residents of the camp self-organised to meet their needs bears resemblance 
to, and could provide strategies for, the way settled populations respond 
to, say, the decline of the universal welfare state in the European polities 
(Hirst, 2013; Mbembe, 2016).7
The politics of the camp is therefore exemplary in three ways: as 
an inspiration and resource for settled citizens of European states that 
mobilize around their experience of the camp to help resettle refugees 
and migrants and oppose governments and policies hostile to them; as a 
resource for refugees and migrants themselves for whom direct or indirect 
experience of the camp’s political processes progressed or kickstarted their 
continuing political development; but just as importantly, as a generally 
though still differentially accessible repertoire of practices that extends 
what citizenship can be. 
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It would be a mistake to romanticise the politics of the camp or to 
demonise the responses of government. Not only would this ignore the 
instances in which politics broke down along national, racial, gender, or 
indeed political lines in the camp, for instance, but also the many laudable 
initiatives at local, national, and supranational levels in France, the UK, 
and elsewhere. Throughout the European ‘refugee crisis’ and across Europe, 
civil society in particular has attempted to respond in ways that outstrip 
the responses of states. There have been progressive responses by national 
governments, most notably of Germany and Sweden, in accepting hundreds 
of thousands of migrants in 2015/6. The EU has also responded positively 
by attempting to ensure that the burden of resettling refugees is shared 
amongst member states – though this sharing has not been extensively 
implemented (European Commission, 2017). It is also important to note 
the ways in which civil society actors have used supranational government 
to hold national governments to account. The appeal by civil society groups 
such as Safe Passage to the Dublin Accord to ensure that children in the 
camp could be reunited with their family is a case in point; it has driven 
UK government policy, for example (though that policy has again not 
been fully implemented - Safe Passage, 2017). To describe the politics of 
the camp as exemplary is not to oversimplify or ignore the many positive 
responses from European civil society, states, and the EU itself.
It is, then, neither a romanticisation nor an oversimplification to speak 
of the exemplarity of the politics of the camp. But the attempt to delimit 
the space of the political and restrict the practice of citizenship through 
the constitutive power of the sovereign state is perhaps especially likely to 
give rise, outside these limits, to an expanded and resistant conception of 
democracy and citizenship with ties and obligations that transcend those 
owed to co-national citizens. The existence of such spaces – in this case 
within the literal space of the Calais camp, in post-Calais places, and in 
other similar camps and refugee spaces, within the body-politic of European 
democratic states - gives lie to the claim that the rights of states harmonize 
effortlessly with the safeguarding of human rights for individuals. Not only 
can the rights of national citizens coexist alongside the complete absence of 
rights for migrants, but it is an open question as to whether the former is to 
121
F R O M  M A R G I N  T O  T H E  C E N T R E ?
some extent predicated on – and therefore complicit with – the withholding 
of rights from the latter. The suggestion, then, is that the example provided 
by the camp is the basis for an extended concept of citizenship, moving 
beyond the ties and obligations that define national citizenship to a more 
plural, mobile, and decolonised conception. 
It is also important that it is ‘citizenship’ that is extended, rather than 
the more general and more abstract concept of the acting subject. The 
rights and obligations of citizens have usually been restricted in traditional 
liberal thought to the relations of individuals in and to the bounded 
society. This restriction generates the opposition between the reciprocal 
rights and obligations of citizens and the non-reciprocal, supererogatory 
actions of individuals acting essentially for others who lack the power 
to act for themselves. But this opposition is not what is being proposed 
here. At a minimum, the exemplary character of the politics of the camp 
problematises any understanding of practical agency along these lines. 
The burgeoning civic, associationalist, and political life of the ‘Jungle’ 
repudiates the accepted definition of camp residents as mute and passive 
recipients of aid and puts pressure, in turn, on any restricted understanding 
of ‘citizenship’ in these circumstances. 
Finally, it is this capacity to extend our conception of citizenship that 
represents an opportunity for the politics of the periphery both to react 
back on and alter the politics of the centre, and to give volume to that flat 
conceptual plane. By acting with rather than for refugees, the opportunity 
presents itself to extend our understanding of ourselves – whether national 
citizens, European citizens, or those without state citizenship – as political 
actors. Instead of seeing ourselves as settled citizens of a bounded state, we 
come instead to view ourselves as members of an open polity, constantly 
mobile, in the process of reinterpreting ourselves and what it means to be 
a ‘citizen’ of such a state. It further follows from this fluidity that who ‘we’ 
are is not fixed but is itself constantly open to being extended, re-thought, 
and re-interpreted.
This process by which the conception of citizenship comes to be 
extended does not impute a universal significance to the experience of the 
camp and the politics practised there. It does, however, undermine the 
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claim to universality for the conception of citizenship operative in European 
democracies, and for most of the modifications of that concept – opposing 
its gendering, its classed character, its age limitations, for instance – that 
are proposed. The extension of the concept of citizenship is on one level 
just that; the extension to non-citizens, to those excluded from the rights 
and privileges of citizenship. At another level, however, it is the extension of 
what citizenship might be; what it might involve. The forms of citizenship 
appearing within the ‘Jungle’ and persisting thereafter come much closer 
to the expanded, continuing pursuit of questions about democracy, and the 
decolonial repossessions mobilised from within, that have been proposed, 
in very different contexts, by Mbembe (2016) and Joseph-Gabriel (2015), 
as well as the renegotiations of ‘Mediterranean’ citizenship (Amin, 2004; 
Solano, 2016) – not as central versus marginal, but as ‘becoming-European’, 
or as at a crossroads.
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Notes
1 It would be possible and interesting, here, to consider the politics of No 
Borders and other humanitarian-focused organisations, in relation to the 
quite disparate political views of residents; or the relations between secular 
and non-secular NGOs and the residents. Even more specifically, it would 
be valuable to consider the relations between activists and ‘humanitarian’ 
volunteers, as well as between those from different backgrounds (national, 
religious) and relations between different types of volunteering, more or 
less professionalised. Such discussion is unfortunately beyond the scope 
of this chapter (but see McGee and Pelham, 2017). We are also strongly 
aware that the prior political persecution of many residents meant that 
they were necessarily going to operate politically in implicit ways. We have 
paid attention to these implicitly ‘political’ expressions by camp residents, 
rather than their silences about overtly political issues.
2 For the work developed in Calais, including Life Stories, please see the 
Educating without borders website https://educatingwithoutborders.
wordpress.com/ and the University for all ‘Life Stories’ page within it: 
https://educatingwithoutborders.wordpress.com/university-for-all-2/#. 
This course has since continued in collaboration with the OLIve Erasmus+ 
open learning initiative for people from refugee backgrounds, now in 
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T I M  H A L L ,  A U R A  L O U N A S M A A  A N D  C O R I N N E  S Q U I R E
process at UEL, the University of Vienna, and CEU; as well as within the 
Greater Manchester Refugee Support Network, UNITE, the youth group 
NOMAD, and at other upcoming venues. For OLIve, please see: https://
www.uel.ac.uk/schools/social-sciences/olive 
3 Please see the Educating without borders Displaces page for photography 
https://educatingwithoutborders.wordpress.com/displaces-a-project-
by-gideon-mendel-and-calais-jungle-residents/   and ‘The Bridge’ for 
an example of film.  Later work includes a further Displaces ‘Beautiful 
Swarm’  project (https://displacesblog.wordpress.com/) and a number 
of videos (for instance, ‘Who opens a school…’ http://loudminority.
co.uk/?portfolio=who-opens-a-school by Bhavesh Hindocha of Loud 
Minority, and Majid Adin’s ‘Rocket Man’ https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=DtVBCG6ThDk). 
4 Hopetowns is a refugee-lead informal group providing two-way support 
for volunteers and refugees from the ‘Jungle’ camps and elsewhere, and 
which communicates through social media https://www.facebook.com/
hopetownsUK/ (Accessed 23 July 2018). 
5 See for example Stories and Supper https://www.storiesandsupper.co.uk/ 
(accessed 23 July 2018) and Welcome Cinema and Kitchen http://
welcomepresents.com/ (accessed 23 July 2018).  
6 This is something Coe and Vandegrift  (2014) have described in other 
contexts as a form of practical utopianism. This framing is also close to 
the ‘prophetic pragmatism’ Cornell West (1989) lays out. See also work on 
horizontal and transversal politics: Maeckelbergh (2012); Massey, 1999). 
7 Here we are deploying Mbembe’s emphasis on repair or reparative, creative 
skills, in low-resourced African contexts (2016) as well as Hirst’s (2013) 
emphasis on the value of ‘associative’ organisations and structures. 
